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Anthony P. Atkinson
COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY, THE study ofpsychiatric disorders using the methodsand models of cognitive neuropsycholo-
gy, has paid particular attention to monothemat-
ic delusions, which include the Capgras, Cotard,
and Fregoli delusions, mirrored-self misidentifi-
cation, and reduplicative paramnesia. These de-
lusions have attracted a fair amount of philo-
sophical interest. Pathologies of Belief (Coltheart
and Davies, 2000) is a welcome manifestation of
this interdisciplinary interest. Originally published
as a special edition of the journal Mind and
Language, it consists of eight essays by psycholo-
gists and philosophers.
What are pathologies of belief? That question is
not answered in this book, not directly at any rate.
Clear examples can sometimes suffice, and in this
case, I think they do. Obviously, the above-men-
tioned delusions are thought to qualify as pa-
thologies of belief; otherwise, the book would
not have the title it has. There is one chapter about
theory of mind deficits (as indicated by failures
on false belief tasks, for example), so presumably
they qualify too. All well and good, but even if we
leave aside the question of what else counts as a
pathology of belief (for the book never claims to be
comprehensive anyway), there is still clearly room
for debate about whether all cases of delusions and
theory of mind deficits count, and if not, Why?
This matter is addressed in several of the chap-
ters, though really only with respect to delusions.
The psychology of belief is, of course, a staple
of the philosophical diet, so it is not surprising
that some philosophers are showing a keen inter-
est in the study of cases in which the normal
processes of belief fixation go awry. The philoso-
phers represented in Pathologies of Belief are all,
broadly speaking, from the cognitive science sta-
ble, as are the psychologists. Although the dis-
cussions and arguments contained in the book
are diverse, I came away feeling that while a
reasonably united front was being presented, I
was not much the wiser in regard to the alterna-
tives (apart from psychodynamic approaches,
which are fairly criticized for being unable, in
and of themselves, to account for why many
delusional subjects have some kind of neurologi-
cal abnormality or damage).
Together, the essays in Pathologies of Belief
illustrate in various ways what I take to be two
general requirements and one desideratum for
cognitive neuropsychiatry’s success. The require-
ments, which I see as applicable to psychology in
general, are the need for a pluralist approach and
the need to keep the personal and subpersonal
levels of description and explanation distinct,
while seeking to show how accounts at one level
relate to accounts at the other level. The desider-
atum is that we have accounts that develop gen-
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eral links between experience and reasoning and,
thus, between deficits in each. I shall discuss each
of these issues in turn.
Many of the chapters advocate or illustrate a
pluralist approach. They see cognitive neuropsy-
chology as being a very promising paradigm for
advancing our understanding of psychiatric dis-
orders but are also of the view that a full under-
standing of those disorders requires input from
research at multiple levels of enquiry. Certainly,
they mean by this input from different levels
within cognitive neuropsychology (evidenced, for
example, by a useful reminder in Currie’s chap-
ter of the distinction between high-level func-
tional explanations and explanations that appeal
to the underlying biology). However, there is
also the suggestion that elements of theories from
other paradigms should be included, even those
sometimes seen as being in opposition to cognitive
neuropsychology (e.g., psychodynamic theories).
Andrew Young’s chapter, for example, is an
extended and convincing argument for why a
cognitive neuropsychiatric approach is the lead-
ing contender for explaining certain delusions.
An important part of this argument is psychody-
namic theory’s inability to account for the neuro-
logical damage found in many but not all cases
of monothematic delusions. (Some instances of
these delusions, sometimes observed in schizo-
phrenics, do not have identifiable neurological
correlates, as Breen et al. discuss in their chap-
ter.) Yet Young is careful to embrace a multilevel
approach to the study of delusions that incorpo-
rates neurological and psychological (including,
perhaps, psychodynamic) factors: “There are ac-
tually a number of different phenomena [involved
in these delusions] which need to be explained,
and these exist at levels of discourse requiring
different levels of explanation” (p. 56).
A pluralist approach is well illustrated by
Breen, Caine, Coltheart, Hendy, and Roberts,
who present four case studies of delusions of
misidentification: two of mirrored-self misiden-
tification and one each of reduplicative param-
nesia and reverse intermetamorphosis. They dis-
cuss each of these cases in terms of their
neurological basis, cognitive or neuropsycholog-
ical deficits, and phenomenological profiles. In
so doing, they emphasize the differences among
the cases, rather than the more traditional enter-
prise of stressing the common denominator. This
exemplifies an issue also discussed by Young,
namely, the pros and cons of symptom- versus
syndrome-based approaches.
In Robyn Langdon and Max Colheart’s chap-
ter, a pluralist approach can be seen in their
proposal as to what is required for a full cogni-
tive neuropsychiatric account of delusions. Such
an account, they argue, requires an explanation
not only of how delusional beliefs get their par-
ticular thematic content, but also of how pa-
tients come to have those delusional beliefs in the
first place. (This is a specific case of a distinction,
familiar to philosophers of mind, concerning psy-
chological states in general.) Langdon and Col-
heart’s view is that explanations of the content of
particular delusional beliefs may require an ap-
peal to some perceptual abnormality and to a
particular attributional or reasoning bias, as oth-
er authors in this issue also argue, but that ap-
peal to either or both of these factors is not
sufficient to explain the presence of delusional
beliefs. They go on to sketch a model of normal
belief generation and evaluation, which they claim
can explain the presence of delusional beliefs. So
on their view, a full account of delusions—that
is, one that explains both their presence and their
content—involves two deficits, namely, a percep-
tual aberration and faulty belief evaluation in
combination with individual attributional bias-
es. Langdon and Colheart illustrate how a range
of delusions, including some that do not have an
identifiable neurological basis as well as those
that do, can be explained in this way.
In detailing their normal model of belief gen-
eration and evaluation, Langdon and Coltheart
claim that there is a natural human bias, pre-
served in delusional patients, for favoring per-
sonal-level causal explanations over subperson-
al-level causal explanations. They are appealing
here to a distinction between levels of descriptive
and explanatory discourse that has wider appli-
cation in psychology and philosophy (Dennett
1969). To a first approximation, personal-level
phenomena are those picked out in the conceptu-
al scheme of folk psychology: beliefs, desires,
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intentions, reasoning, thinking, and the like—
phenomena that apply to actors in environments,
as Dennett says. Subpersonal-level phenomena,
in contrast, are those picked out by the concep-
tual schemes of the brain and cognitive scienc-
es—sciences that view humans as biological ma-
chines.
An unresolved issue is how the personal and
subpersonal levels are related: Can some or all
personal-level concepts be reduced to subperson-
al-level concepts, or are the two levels autono-
mous? Is there instead a middle ground, such as
“interaction without reduction” (Davies
2000a,b)? My money is on the latter option.
Moreover, my view is that a truly pluralist ap-
proach in psychology, one that integrates both
the personal and subpersonal levels, is the most
promising way forward. That is to say, a plural-
ist approach should be structured around the
personal/subpersonal distinction, not least be-
cause it reduces the chances of different disci-
plines simply talking past each other and should
at least be open to ways in which these two
overarching levels of theorizing might be inte-
grated.
Consider then, Philip Gerrans’s thoughtful but
concise essay in which he offers an account of
the Cotard delusion that adapts an idea first
proposed by Young and Leafhead (1996). Ac-
cording to that idea, which seems to belong to
the personal level of explanation, Cotard and
Capgras delusions involve the same anomalous
phenomenal experience (lack of affective response
to stimuli) but different attributional styles.
Capgras patients, in this view, explain their weird
experience by locating the problem in the exter-
nal world (“my spouse has been replaced by an
imposter”), whereas Cotard patients explain it
by identifying the problem with themselves (“I’m
dead”). However, according to Gerrans, this ac-
count is not sufficient for explaining the differ-
ence between these two delusions. He highlights
the fact that Capgras patients have a localized
affective deficit, confined to certain familiar fac-
es, places, or objects, whereas Cotard patients
have a global affective deficit (severe depres-
sion). Young and colleagues also note this differ-
ence, but for Gerrans it is crucial: The global
affective deficit in Cotard patients is, in his view,
the causal origin of the delusion, though not a
sufficient cause. Gerrans argues, as do Langdon
and Coltheart, that Cotard patients also have a
reasoning deficit. His particular proposal is that
this reasoning deficit (a deficit posited at the
personal level) is produced by the neurochemical
substrate of a deluded patient’s depressive state
(the subpersonal level) and is evidenced by the
failure of these patients to implicate themselves
in their own experiences, leading them to ratio-
nalize their depression in the peculiar way that
these people do (the personal level again).
Consider next, Gregory Currie’s proposal that
schizophrenic delusions are disorders of imagi-
nation, insofar as they involve a failure to distin-
guish between what is imagined and what is
believed. He sets up his pluralist account with
the help of Frith’s (1992) two proposals, accord-
ing to which schizophrenic delusions either in-
volve a deficiency in metarepresentation (which
Frith also claims to be the basis of theory of mind
deficits) or an impairment of action and inten-
tion monitoring due to impaired efference copy-
ing. Currie suggests that the first of Frith’s claims
is a personal-level explanation, whereas the sec-
ond lies at the subpersonal level. However, Cur-
rie is not hopeful that Frith’s two claims can be
brought together into a unified theory in which
the subpersonal story about deficient efference
copying explains the personal level story about a
metarepresentational deficit. Currie criticizes
Frith’s metarepresentational theory, but sees more
promise in the proposal about efference copying,
using it to underpin his own account.
Now consider Ian Gold and Jakob Hohwy’s
lucid account of schizophrenic thought insertion
(an account that, they conjecture, may be useful
in explaining other schizophrenic delusions).
Based on a discussion of Frith’s (1987, 1992)
influential theory of delusion, they propose that
thought insertion is irrational but not according
to the traditional canons of rationality. Accord-
ing to a new branch of the theory of rationality
they call “experiential rationality,” a principal
constraint on rational thought is the registering
in consciousness of thoughts “as having originat-
ed in one’s own mind.” Thought insertion clearly
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violates this “egocentricity” constraint. This leads
Gold and Hohwy to emphasize the particular
phenomenology of thought insertion, namely, its
alien quality as being more central to its explana-
tion than the disorders of belief or reasoning
proposed by Breen et al., Langdon and Colth-
eart, Young, and Stone and Young (1997).
Gold and Hohwy’s account is pitched at the
personal rather than subpersonal level: The cen-
tral explanatory construct in their account, name-
ly, the alien quality of inserted thoughts, is a
property of people, not of their brains. Gerrans
and Currie, in contrast, present accounts that
integrate personal- and subpersonal-level pro-
posals. We can also see personal- and subperson-
al-level proposals in other chapters (e.g., Breen et
al.). My only complaint is that some of these
authors (Gold and Hohwy, for example) could
have been more explicit about the level or levels
at which their proposals are pitched. Indeed, a
worthy future project would be for someone to
classify extant theories of delusions into person-
al- and subpersonal-level accounts and then sort
out which of these theories are compatible, both
within and between levels.
Let us now turn to my third key issue for
discussion: the desire for accounts that develop
general links between experience and reasoning.
Experience and reasoning are phenomena that,
as we can now say, belong to the personal level
but on which, we are hoping, subpersonal-level
theories might be able to shed some light. Cen-
tral to many of the papers in this book seems to
be the struggle to make sense of the relationship
between deficits in experience, broadly conceived
(to include deficits in language-processing skills,
for example, and in face-processing skills), and
deficits in reasoning, especially abilities for cer-
tain forms of reasoning about self and others.
Candida Peterson and Michael Siegal’s chapter
provides a fresh angle on this theme by present-
ing an intriguing account of theory of mind defi-
cits (i.e., deficits in reasoning about the mental
states of self and others) in deaf children. Peter-
son and Siegal review a number of studies (in-
cluding their own), which show that deaf chil-
dren, especially those from hearing families who
come to use sign language late, are impaired on
various theory of mind tests compared to deaf
native signers and hearing children. As discussed,
there is an interesting parallel with autism here
in that, like deaf children, autistics tend also to
have impaired spoken language skills in addition
to impaired theory of mind skills (e.g., Frith
1989; Tager-Flusberg 1993). What connects these
two populations, Peterson and Siegal propose, is
restricted early exposure to conversation, espe-
cially about mental states, as the result of im-
paired hearing and the lack of a shared language
in the deaf and social aloofness and language
difficulties in autistics.
That we find a chapter about theory of mind
deficits in a book about pathologies of belief
raises the question, which I posed initially, name-
ly: What counts as a pathology of belief? In
particular, is there any meaningful way in which
theory of mind deficits can be lumped together
with monothematic delusions under that one
heading? Whatever the answer to those ques-
tions, one thing is clear: As we have just seen,
there are certainly enough common elements in
these two classes of disorder and common con-
cerns in their study to warrant inclusion of Peter-
son and Siegal’s chapter in this book. Their chap-
ter does not seem out of place here but rather as
an essay in need of company.
Finally, let me address the introduction by
Martin Davies and Max Coltheart, which is not
a standard one in the sense of being a straightfor-
ward summary of the other chapters and how
they interrelate and contrast with one another.
Instead, Davies and Coltheart succeed in offering
something that, in this case at least, is probably
more useful in the form of a chapter that stands
on its own but which also speaks to the subse-
quent chapters in the book. First, they map the
conceptual landscape in which pathologies of
belief are located, concentrating in particular on
the issue of whether monothematic delusions re-
ally qualify as false beliefs (their conclusion is
that in most cases, they do). Second, Davies and
Coltheart develop a schematic account of the
etiology of delusions, which draws on and elabo-
rates Stone and Young’s (1997) valuable contri-
bution. Monothematic delusions, according to
Davies and Coltheart, involve (a) a cognitive
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deficit and associated “perceptual, affective or
other experiential anomaly” resulting from brain
injury, which the subject then attempts to ex-
plain by (b) generating a hypothesis that is given
priority as the result of some factor, such as a
reasoning bias, and which (c) is then adopted
and maintained as a belief (d) without any signif-
icant disruption to the rest of the subject’s be-
liefs, thanks probably to motivational factors.
This sketch of an account certainly admits the
need for a pluralist approach and seems to keep
the personal and subpersonal levels distinct,
though without explicitly developing that issue
in the way that I have suggested (perhaps sur-
prising, given Davies’s work elsewhere on the
issue) and hints at a link between deficits in
experience and deficits in reasoning. It is a prom-
ising proposal.
Pathologies of Belief is a stimulating book of
obvious interest to readers of this journal. In-
deed, if you have not read it, I recommend that
you put it at the top of your “to read” lists, even
(or perhaps, especially) if you are not yet con-
vinced of the explanatory power and promise of
cognitive neuropsychiatry. This book also de-
serves, and I suspect shall reach, a wider audi-
ence. In addition, there is at least one advantage
in owning the book as opposed to the original
journal version: the provision of an index.
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